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Abstract: The Merchant Registration in the Secure
Electronic Transaction (SET) protocol is presented and
its formal analysis is described. Based on the analysis,
this paper unveils some potential vulnerabilities of SET.
Such vulnerabilities have been identified when ENDL
(extension of non-monotonic logic) is applied to verify the
Merchant Registration in SET protocol. To our
knowledge, this is the first attempt to analyze the
Merchant Registration. Also, we present the modeling of
the Merchant Registration for the purpose of
mechanically model checking.
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1. Introduction
Security is a necessary concern in e-commerce. Nearly
everyday, a news organization reports a potential security
violation on the Internet. Thus, a number of secure
protocols have been developed to meet the user's
expectation for secure business transactions. For example,
toward achieving secure on-line transaction, flisa and
MasterCard developed the SET protocol to safeguard the
secure payment card transactions over the Internet. The
secure protocols [1][6][7] widely use encryption and
decryption functions to achieve the secure requirements.
But the cryptographic protocol is prone to error and a
number of well-known and largely used cryptographic
protocols have been proved to have some potential flaws
[17]. Recently, using formal methods to verify such
protocols has received increasing attention.
Currently, there are many remarkable efforts on
developing methodologies, theories, logics, and other
supporting tools. These efforts are effective to overcome
the weakness and reduce the redundancies in the protocol
design stage. Some typical approaches are the BAN logic
[9], GNY logic [10], BGNY logic [11] and AUTOLOG
logic [13]. They focus on the verification of
authentication protocols. E-commerce protocols,
however, are inherently complex and a number of
published protocols of this nature contain subtle errors.
For example, the protocols developed by Needham. and
Schroeder [17] are vulnerable to attacks by intruders [8].
Kailar's analysis of simple e-commerce protocols has
been proven to be successful [12]. After that, there have
been attempts to verify more realistic protocols such as
Kerberos [14] and TLS/SSL [15]. However, the analysis
of complex e-commerce protocols is still out of their
reach. Meadows and Syverson [20] give a formal
specification for payment transactions in the SET protocol
but do not describe the actual analysis. Bella and Paulson
[16] presented the formal verification of cardholder
registration in Isabelle, in which the formal protocol
model is declared as a set of traces. However, the methods
for verification of e-commerce protocols are not quite as
mature as those used for authentication protocols. The
new types of threats, such as payment card transaction,
caused by new requirements of on-line transaction will be
a significant challenge to the analysis of e-commerce
protocols. To our knowledge, existing tools cannot cover
these problems in many cases.
The SET protocol is intended for the processing of
payment card transactions over the Internet. However, the
formal techniques used for the verification of
authentication protocols cannot be directly applied to
payment card transaction of SET, mainly because of the
difference between traditional authentication and
particular properties of SET. The SET protocol includes
some standard authentication requirement. For example,
in Cardholder Registration, cardholder (C) firstly must
register with a Certificate Authority (CA). After receiving
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the initial response, C wants to verify the certificate and
ensure that he was communicating with the right CA. Also,
some particular properties are included in the payment
process. For example, when the cardholder verifies the
certificate of CA, he wants to make sure that it is the
proper CA who issues the certificate. Thus C has to
validate it by traversing a series of certificate authorities
in a multilevel trust chain. The validation process may
stop at a level that has been previously validated. In the
case where the validation fails the cardholder could cancel
the transaction.
In this paper, we show how the ENDL can be used for
verifying the Merchant Registration in the SET protocol.
The dynamic and non-monotonic properties of ENDL
allow us to convert the transaction into a sequence of
actions and deal with the special processes of SET such as
the verification by a multilevel trust chain. Also, we show
how the verification can be implemented in high
efficiency by using mechanically model checking.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, the process of Merchant Registration is
cursorily described. Section 3 presents the notations,
metrology and terminology. Section 4 gives the complete
verification to the Merchant Registration. Section 5 gives
the modeling of the Merchant Registration in Prolog.
Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper.
2. Merchant Registration in SET Protocol
The SET protocol [1][2][3] has been developed and
standardized jointly by fua and MasterCard. SET uses
cryptography to provide confidentiality, interoperability
and payment integrity, and to authenticate the identity of
the cardholder and the merchant to each other. In general,
the payment system participants include Cardholder (C),
Issuer, Merchant (M), Acquirer and Payment Gateway (P).
Cardholder uses the credit card, issued by issuer, to
purchase a product or service provided by the merchant
Payment Gateway processes the payment instruction from
the cardholder and the payment request from the merchant.
A hierarchy of trust, namely PIa (Public key
infrastructure) tree, is introduced and used for certificate
issuance. To verify the validity of a received certificate,
you must follow this tree to a known trusted party,
CARoot who provide the user with the digital certificate
for signature and encryption. All SET participants know
the public signature key and public key-exchange key of
CARoot But the verification may not always traverse the
geopolitical certificate authority in this way.
SET consists of five phrases. This paper presents the
verification of Merchant Registration. In this phase, the
User can register the signature certificate, which will be
USedto confirm that a transaction is from a legal merchant
of a payment brand. Merchant Registration includes five
fundamental steps.
• Initiate request. Merchant M sends initiate request to
CA.
• Initiate response. After receiving the request, CA
selects the appropriate registration form and digitally
signs it by generating the message digest of the form and
encrypting it with CA private signature key. Finally, CA
sends registration form and CA certificates to merchant.
• Merchant certificate request. The merchant verifies
the CA certificate and signature and creates two pairs of
keys for later use. Then M fills out the registration form
with information such as the merchant's name, address,
and merchant ID. The merchant takes this registration
information and combines it with the public keys in a
registration message that is digitally signed by M. Next
merchant generates a random symmetric encryption key.
This key, along with the account data AcctData(M) is then
encrypted with the CA public key-exchange key. The
encrypted certificate request message is transmitted to CA.
• Certificate Authority processes request and creates
certificates. The CA verifies the merchant signature. If the
signature is valid, the message is processed; otherwise the
message is rejected and an appropriate response message
is returned to the merchant Next the CA must verify the
information from the registration request using known
merchant information. If the information in the
registration request is valid, the CA creates and digitally
signs the merchant certificates. The validity of these
certificates will be determined by the policy of CA. The
certificates are then encrypted using a new randomly
generated symmetric key, which in turn is encrypted using
the merchant public key-exchange key. Finally, the
response is sent to M.
• Merchant Certificates. When M receives the
response from CA, it decrypts the digital envelope to
obtain the symmetric encryption key, which is used to
decrypt the registration response containing the merchant
certificates. If the certificates are verified, the merchant
stores the certificates on its computer for use in future
transaction.
3. Overview of ENDL
Some notations of ENDL [4][5] are recalled here by
outline such as encryption, decryption, and hashing,
which are largely used in SET protocol.
In general, uppercase X; Y, CA (Certificate Authorities)
and CARoot denote particular principals; mi; m2> •••••• ,
and m. denote specific messages; T denotes specific
timestamp that can be used to both authenticate the
validity of message and assert that the message is
generated by current session; Cert denotes the certificate
that needs to be verified; k denotes encryption or
decryption keys; Generate and Send denote specific
actions (Encryption and digital signature etc. are some
mapping operation on message, but not action.).
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Function words are the abstract description of
operations on the message. They consist of the encryption,
signature, message digest and such like.
E(m, k): The message m is encrypted by the
symmetric encryption key k.
S(m, k): The message m is encrypted by the public key
k, namely Kpb(X), Kpv(X), Spb(X), and Spv(X) listed
below.
H(m): The message digest of message m encoded by
one-way hashing algorithm H(x). One-way Hash
function has the property that, given the output, it is
difficult to determine the input.
Kpb(X): The public key-exchange key of X
Kpv(X): The private key-exchange key ofX
Spb(X): The public signature key ofX
Spv(X): The private signature key ofX .
< mi , m2 , •..•.. , m">: The combination of messages m, ,
m2 ••..••• , andmR•
When the message digest of a message is encrypted
using the senders' private key and is appended to the
original message, the result is known as digital signature
of the message (see abbreviation below).
Action: Applied to describe that the principal try to
execute some appointed task. There are three types of
actions listed below:
Generate(X. mY:X generates the message m.
Send(X. Y,my: X sends the message m to y after X
successfully generated the message m.
~riJY(x' Cert, <CAb CA2 , •••••• , CARoot»: X
verified certificate Cert by traversing the trust chain,
CAb CAb , to the root CARoot (Below, we
assume CA = (CAb CAl> ......• CARoot}).
Applying the conventional logic operator can derive
further action. Suppose a and p are basic sequence of
actions, then a 0 p denotes the conjunction of a and p.
Thus, integrating with the known actions can generate the
new actions.
Predicate: Applied to express the knowledge state and
belief relation of principals:
Know(X. my: X knows message m. It is possible X
generate the message m by itself or receives m from Y.
Auth(X. Y,my: X authenticates message m is sent by Y,
and m has not been modified. If X can authenticate the
message m is valid, then return true; otherwise return
false.
Is~rified(X. CA. Cert): if X can verify the Cert is
valid, then it returns true, otherwise returns false.
Equal(m. m j: if message m equals to message m', then
it returns true, otherwise returns false.
Assertion:
P and Q present the set of formulae; a denotes the
sequence of actions. This assertion means if the premise P
is true then a can be executed. and the conclusion Q will
be true if a can be performed successfully.
Abbreviation:
Sign(X, m)= <m. S«IDx. H(m». Spv(X))>: This
represents plain text m and X's identifier IDx are
affixed to X's digital signature.
Sign(J(, mJr = <m, S«IDx• 1; Htm)>, Spv(X))>:
Inserting the timestamp T into Sign (X. my;
So(X, m) = S«IDx. Htm)>, Spv(X)): This represents
identifier IDx is attached to X's digital signature
before X encrypted the message digest of m in
private signature key Spv(X).
.So(X. m)T = S«IDx. 1; Htm)>, Spv(X)): Inserting the
timestamp T into SO(X, m)
CertK(X) = Sign(CA. <)(, Kpb(X»): The key-
exchange certificate ofX;
CertS(X) = Sign( CA, <)(, Spb(X»): The signature
certificate ofX
4. The Verification of Merchant Registration
In our former work, we have shown how to use our
framework to validate the secure protocols, including the
cardholder registration in the SET protocol [4][5].
Currently, some related works [8][16] are being
developed to analyse this protocol, but the large e-
commerce protocols, such as SET, are very complex and
have never been formalized before. Meanwhile, the
specification of SET protocol itself is incomplete [16].
For instance, a merchant verifies that the Chall-EE (BE's
challenge to eA's signature freshness). a fresh random.
received matches the one sent in the Me-AqCInitReq
(Merchant or Acquirer Certificate Initialization Request
messages). EE denotes the End Entity, including M, Cor
P. Actually, it is dangerous since an intruder could
intercept Chall-EE and replay it [4]. Some potential
vulnerability in cardholder registration has been reported
in [4]. Thus, it is not surprising that some potentially
dangerous flaws can be detected during the verification of
Merchant Registration. Also the feasible method to settle
the problem is presented and wants to draw the attention
of the protocol designer.
Based on the description of Merchant Registration in
Section 2, the verification is divided into five phases
accordingly. Some hidden messages and complex
operations such as secret value and hashing algorithm etc.
are abstracted away for brevity.
4.1 Initiate Request
Merchants must register with a CA before they can
process the SET transactions. In order to send SET
message to the CA, the merchant must have a copy of the
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CA public key-exchange key, which is contained in the
CA key-exchange certificate. Meanwhile M also needs a
copy of the registration form from the financial institution,
which is used to identify the Acquirer to CA. The
registration starts when M sends initiate request lnitReq to
CA and wishes to get a copy of the CA key-exchange
certificate and a suitable registration form. This process
can be denoted by abbreviation, Send{M, CA, InitReq).
Nothing needs to be verified since no message is deemed
necessary to be protected during this step.
4.2 Initiate Response
After receiving lnitReq, the CA identifies the
merchant's financial institution and selects the suitable
registration form, which is digitally signed using the CA
private signature key. Next the CA sends the registration
form along with CA certificates to merchant
a = Generate(CA, RegForm) 0 Send(CA, M, <RegForm,
S(H(RegForm), Spv(CA))» 0 Send(CA, M, <CertS(CA),
CertK(CA» )
Actually, the intruder can intercept the communication
between the CA and M and replay this message.
(1) M -+ Z (CA): InitReq
(2) Z(M) -+ CA: InitReq'
(3)CA-+Z(M): <CertS(CA), CertK(CA), RegForm',
S(H(RegForm j, Spv(CA))>
(2') Z(M) -+ CA: InitReq"
(3 ')CA-+Z(M): <CertS(CA), CertK(CA),RegForm",
S(H(RegForm "). Spv(CA))>
(4)Z(CA)-+M: <CertS(CA), CertK(CA), RegForm',
S(H(RegForm j, Spv(CA))>
Here, the intruder Z intercepts the initial request from
M to CA and replaces it with a new initial request initReq'
and sends it to CA as the message (2). CA replies with
essage (3). Z impersonates M to produces a new
message (2') and sends it to CA. The CA answers M with
corresponding message (3'), and then Z intercepts it.
Finally, Z impersonates CA to send an outdated message
(4) that is intercepted by Z from message (3). This attack
is continuously used until M wants to bring about
authentication between M and CA again.
The reason is that the SET documents cannot give the
detailed descriptions and sometimes are misleading. For
example, it is unconvincing that the MeAqInitReq
message can be securely sent to CA since no clear
description indicates that the encryption or security policy
has been applied. However, we cannot exclude the
possibility that the Chall-EE is intercepted or tamped by
the intruder. Thus, we think it is unfeasible, at least
dangerous, to believe the CA's signature freshness. The
SET designer should describe this more clearly. This
paper gives an optional method, in which the timestamp,
Chal-EE and identifier IDCA are included in the response
Illes sage before it is encrypted.
(3) CA-+Z(M): <CertS(CA), CertK(CA),RegForm '.
S«IDCA, Chall-EE, H(RegForm j>, Spv(CA))>
This can prevent the above attack from working
because the intruder will be unable to replay the message
as before [18][19].
On the other hand, CA may alter the registration form
RegForm for the sake of network block. If CA does not let
M know what has been altered about RegForm or let M-
know the change but the content of new initiate response
does not keep the same as the old one, namely -Equal(m,
m j, M should stop the current transaction and validate the
initiate response again. We do not need to concern about
the CA certificates since trusted authority issues them.
4.3 Merchant Certificate Request
Once M has a copy of the CA key-exchange certificate
CertK(CA), the merchant can register to accept SET
payment instruction and process SET transactions. M also
generates two pair public/private key pairs for use with
SET: key-exchange and signature. To register, the
merchant fills out the form with registration information
such as the merchant's name and ill. M takes this
registration information and combines it with the public
keys in a registration message. The merchant digitally
signs the registration message. Next M encrypts the
message using a randomly generated symmetric key. This
key, along with the merchant's account data AcctData(M)
is then encrypted using Kpb(CA). Finally the merchant
sends encrypted certificate request CertReq to CA, which
contains the public keys, Kpb(M) and Spb(M).
a = Generate{M, <Spb(M), Spv(M),Kpb(M), Kpv(M») 0
Generate(M, CertReq) 0 Generate(M, kJ 0 Send{M, CA,
E«CertReq, S(H(CertReq),spv(M))>, kJ 0 Send{M, CA,
S«kI, AcctData(M», Kpb(CA)))
When the CA receives the merchant's certificate
request, it decrypts the digital envelop with CA private
key-exchange key to obtain the symmetric key kI, which
is used to decrypt the request.
During the process that the merchant uses Kpb(CA) to
encrypt <kJ, AcctData(M», M does not affix timestamp
T to this message. The reason that the challenge Chall-EE
cannot avoid the replay attacks has been presented above
so it is not repeated. We are concerned with the direct
exposure of symmetric key k] due to negligence or a
design flaw in the system, i.e., an intruder can break into
the computer and get the key. Thus, the intruder Z can
repeat the similar attack like the case in initiate response
since Kpb(CA) is known to all participants.
Msg 4.3.1 M -+ Z (CA): S«kJ, AcctData(M»,
Kpb(CA))
Msg 4.3.2 M -+ Z (CA): E«CertReq, S(H (CertReq),
Spv(M))>, kJ
Msg 4.3.3 Z(M) -+ CA: St-ck,', AcctData(M»,
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Kpb(CA))
Msg 4.3.4 Z(M) -t CA: E«CertReq', S(H(CertReq),
Spv(M))>, k1 ')
Actually, the merchant M may alert symmetric key k]
or account data AcctData(M) since M can wonder these
messages have been masqueraded or the communication
of the network is blocked. Meanwhile, whether the
principals possess memory to message is also a crucial
security factor, but the detailed description is outside this
paper. Thus, we only show which reference rule the result
derives from, but not give the details. Several possibilities
are listed below:
(1) M changes AcctData(M) but not alter k],
(2) M changes k] but not alter AcctData(M),
(3) M changes AcctData(M) and k],
In case (1), M creates a new AcctData(M). If M does
not let CA know what has been altered or let CA know the
change but the content of AcctData(M) does not keep the
same as the original one, CA should fail to authenticate
AcctData(M); In case (2), M creates a new k/. If C does
not let CA know what has been changed about k/, CA
should fail to authenticate <kJ, AcctData(M»; in case (3),
C alters AcctData(M) and k1•If M does not let CA know
what have been changed about k] and AcctData(M) or let
CA know the new AcctData(M) but it does not keep the
same as the original one, CA should fail to authenticate
<k), AcctData(M» and RegFonnReq. Once one of them
happens, CA must stop the process and not send the
request to M. But SET does not provide the clear
description on the similar security policy.
4.4 Certificate Authority processes request and
creates certificates
In this stage, CA processes merchant's request. CA
decrypts the digital envelope to get the symmetric
encryption key. which is used to decrypt the registration
request CA then verifies merchant signature. If the
verification is successful, the message processing
continues, otherwise it is stopped and an appropriate
response is returned to M. Next the CA validates the
information from the registration request with known
merchant information. If the information is verified. the
CA creates the merchant certificates.
a = Generate(CA, CertRes)· Send(CA, M, <CertS(M),
CertK(M») • Send(CA, M, CertRes, S(H(CertRes),
Spv(CA))) • Send(CA, M, CertS(CA))
When M receives the certificate request, the merchant
needs to verify the CertS(CA), CertS(M) and CertK(M) by
using a special trust chain, PKI tree, which popularly
appears in the certificate verification of SET. We only
show the verification of CertS(CA) since the other two
processes are similar.
(1) Send(CA, M, CertS(CA)) [action]
(2)Know(M. CertS(CA)) (1)[R-I]
(3)VeriJY(U CertS(CA), CAY [action]
(4)IsVerijied(U CA, CertS(CA)) [discriminant]
(5)Auth(U CA. <Spb(CA). Spv(CA») (2)(3)(4) [7-1]
The verification process may stop at a level that has
been previously validated. But if M cannot verify the CA
certificate is valid during traversing the trust chain, {CA/,
CAl> , CARoot}, the transaction is rejected.
After confirming the validity of CertS(CA), CertS{M)
and CertK(M). M can verify CA signature. For the
ambiguity of Chall-EE mentioned above, so it is possible
that the intruder Z can handle the next attack.
(1) CA-t Z(M): CertS(CA), CertS(M), CertK(M),
<Certlles, S(H(CertRes), Spv(CA))>
(1') Z(CA) -t M: CertS(CA), CertS(M), CertK{M),
<Certlies', S(H(CertRes j, Spv(CA) j>
Spv(CA)' denotes the replays of old keys or substitution
of bogus key. Obviously, it will cause some serious
damages to financial transaction since the merchant
cannot verify the certificate response. Eventually, an error
message is returned to CA.
In practical transaction, CA may alter CertRes for
wrong format or content etc. If CA does not let M know
what has been changed about CertRes or let M know the
change but the content of new certificate response does
not keep the same as the old one, namely
-Equal(CertRes,Old_CertRes), M should fail to
authenticate CertRes, otherwise this will cause some
potentially dangerous security.
4.5 Merchant Certificate
Based on the verification of certificates, the merchant
stores the certificates, CertS(M) and CertK(M), and
information from response on the merchant's computer
for use in future e-commerce transactions.
The above analyses report some subtle flaws of SET.
Also, some potential concerns in practical transaction are
also presented. This can benefit to the future revision of
SET protocol.
5. Modeling Merchant Registration
This Section presents the design of an automatic
inference framework. The automation can make the
verification easy. Modeling the verification of Merchant
Registration in Prolog requires the distinct specifications
of SET. The definition of SET, however, is incomplete. To
resolve this piQblem, we decided to adopt the business
description of SET [1] as the standard specification. That
means the modeling should conform to the flow of
transactions and the information contained in this flow.
5.1 Designing the Inference Engine
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First of all, we need to establish the inference engine,
which is the kernel in the inference framework. An
inference engine knows how to actively use the
knowledge in the base. Four basic functions of the
framework are listed below:
• Adopt the external file as the infrastructure of
knowledge base;
• Input the facts and new knowledge by the
interaction between the user and the program;
• Access the existing knowledge base;
• Output the result to the database.
Figure 5.1.1 listed below present the algorithm flow
outline. Firstly, we must check if all the rules have been
tried out. If so, the inference should be halted. If not, it
will continue to check if the conclusion of the current rule
has been stored in the Database. If the conclusion can be
found, we will skip this rule and start to check the next
one; otherwise we have to match all the conditions of this
rule one by one. If and only if the return value is true, we
can create the explanation and store the result into





Figure 5.1.1 The algorithm flow
5.2 Handling the Knowledge base and Facts
Two kinds of approaches are applied to handle the
knOWledgebase here. One is inputting a new knowledge
and the other is accessing an existing knowledge base,
Whichcan be denoted by •a ' and' b' respectively.
process ('a1if acquisition




If the system fails to :lind the name of the kn.owledge
base inputted by user, it will return an error message to
the user. To acquire the knowledge, it is acted as rule-
consisted by the condition and conclusion, which are
handled by two functors, conditionjead and
conclusionread, respectively. Also, we number the rules
according to the sequence.
A predefined functor facts Jeading is used to collect
the facts. Every time, when the fact is inputted, we check
ifit is a terminal symbol '.'. If so, the process is halted. If
not, the functor assertz is used to store it into the database.
5.3 Recognition
The infrastructure of the framework is presented above.
Next we employ an instance to show how to use this
framework to mechanically verify it. The detailed
illustrations of whole program, however, are outside this
paper, thus we focus on the rules handling, which actually
is one of the most important components.
The process of merchant certificate request is
intercepted to be the instance. Auth(CA, M. CertReq) is
the proposition that we want to authenticate. Know(CA,
Kpv(CA)) and the messages, E«CertReq, S(H(CertReq),
Spv(M))>, kJ and S«kJ, AcctData(M) >, Kpb(CA)) etc.
sent from M to CA are acted as the known facts and stored
into the database. When the system reads the terminal
symbol "*,, the input of facts will be stopped. Next we
build the knowledge base and store the rules with the
serial number by sequence.
rule(l, [ "Know(CA, S«kJ, AcctData(M»,Kpb(CA)) ':
"Know(CA, Kpv(CA)) "), "Know(CA, kJ ': "Know(CA,
AcctData(M))" 1
rule(2, ["Know(CA, E«CertReq, S(H(CertReq),
Spv(M))>, kJ) ", "Know(CA, kl)" ], "Know(CA,
<CertReq, S(H(CertReq), Spv(M))» ")
rule(3, [ "Know(CA. <CertReq. S(H(CertReq),
Spv(M))» '1, "Know(CA, CertReq) ", "Know(CA,
S(H(CertReq), Spv(M))) ")
rule(4. [ "Know(CA. CertReq) ", "Know(CA, S«lDM,
T, H(CertReq», Spv(M)))", "Know(CA, IClock-T1 <t:
tJ +!:l tJJ"], "Auth(CA, M, CertReq) ")
where Clock is the local time, !:l t, is an interval
representing the normal discrepancy between the server's
clock and the local clock, and !:lt2 is an interval
representing the expected network delay time[4].
After establishing the knowledge base and inputting
all the facts, we can input:
?- Auth(CA, M. CertReq).
According to the inference engine, the program then
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tries to find the matched rule from the knowledge base.
Finally, the system cannot verify Auth(CA, M, CertReq)
and return a message to the user. The result is consistent
with what we describe in Section 4.
Although the instance is only a section of Merchant
Registration, it is convenient to extend the knowledge
base and input new facts for verifying the whole phrase.
Thus, our framework is effective and promising in
mechanically verifying the secure protocols.
6. Conclusion
Because the security protocols in e-commerce are very
important and complicated, so a small negligence in
design stage can cause the hidden trouble of security. We
have used ENDL to provide the formal analysis of
Merchant Registration in SET protocol. To our knowledge,
this is the first attempt to analyze this phase. We have
reported some of the potential vulnerabilities and some
concerns in the practical circumstance. Also, we have
suggested the optional measures to fix these problems and
want to draw the attention of the protocol designer.
In particular, we have described the modeling of
Merchant Registration for the purpose of mechanically
model checking, by which the verification can be
implemented in high efficiency. We used one instance
drawn from Merchant Registration to present how to use
this framework to mechanically verify it From the
observation, our method is useful and promising.
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